A Case for Machine Ethics in Modeling Human-Level Intelligent Agents by Boyles, Robert James M.
 
 
 
KRITIKE VOLUME TWELVE NUMBER ONE (JUNE 2018) 182-200 
 
 
© 2018 Robert James M. Boyles 
https://www.kritike.org/journal/issue_22/boyles_june2018.pdf 
ISSN 1908-7330 
 
 
 
 
Article 
 
A Case for Machine Ethics in Modeling 
Human-Level Intelligent Agents 
 
Robert James M. Boyles 
 
 
Abstract: This paper focuses on the research field of machine ethics and 
how it relates to a technological singularity—a hypothesized, futuristic 
event where artificial machines will have greater-than-human-level 
intelligence. One problem related to the singularity centers on the issue 
of whether human values and norms would survive such an event. To 
somehow ensure this, a number of artificial intelligence researchers 
have opted to focus on the development of artificial moral agents, 
which refers to machines capable of moral reasoning, judgment, and 
decision-making. To date, different frameworks on how to arrive at 
these agents have been put forward. However, there seems to be no 
hard consensus as to which framework would likely yield a positive 
result. With the body of work that they have contributed in the study 
of moral agency, philosophers may contribute to the growing literature 
on artificial moral agency. While doing so, they could also think about 
how the said concept could affect other important philosophical 
concepts. 
 
Keywords: machine ethics, artificial moral agents, technological 
singularity, philosophy of artificial intelligence 
 
Introduction 
 
hroughout history, technological advancements have led to 
philosophical inquiry. Developments in artificial intelligence (AI) 
research, for instance, have prompted philosophers to look into its 
surrounding foundational issues.1 This paper examines one of the said issues, 
specifically focusing on the nature of artificial moral agency and how this 
relates to a technological singularity, the point in which AI will have greater-
than-human-level abilities. Furthermore, this paper also suggests that it is 
                                                 
1 A number of these philosophical issues are discussed in Matt Carter, Minds and 
Computers: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, Ltd., 2007), 202-206.  
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high time for philosophers to get into the picture and discuss the ethical 
implications of the rise of intelligent machines. 
 
Ethical Machines and the Singularity 
 
The idea of artificial moral agents (AMAs) refers to artificial 
intelligent systems capable of moral reasoning, judgment, and decision-
making. It forms part and parcel of what Goertzel2 defines as artificial general 
intelligence (AGI).3 Computer systems with human-like general intelligence 
are AGIs. Contrasted with “narrow artificial intelligence” or “narrow AI,” 
which only exhibits intelligence regarding “specific, narrowly constrained 
problems,”4 AGIs exhibit a variety of human-like, intelligent behavior. Chess 
computer programs, for instance, could be classified as narrow AI systems 
because they are only considered to be intelligent in a single human 
domain—that is, playing chess. In contrast, an AGI is hypothesized to be 
intelligent in most, if not all, aspects of human cognition. Since one of the 
central human cognitive abilities is the capability to reason about moral 
issues, AGIs should, therefore, include the intellectual activity of moral 
reasoning (i.e., AGIs should be AMAs as well). 
The idea of a singularity, on the other hand, refers to a hypothesized, 
futuristic event where greater-than-human-level intelligence exists—
intelligences that are deemed to be a natural offshoot of modeling AI 
systems.5 From this event, it is further hypothesized, that an intelligence 
explosion would follow.6 If such an event were to happen, it would put into 
question a lot of our default notions about reality, truth, and life, including 
most of our ideas about what is right and wrong. 
                                                 
2 See Ben Goertzel, “Human-level Artificial General Intelligence and the Possibility of 
a Technological Singularity: A Reaction to Ray Kurzweil’s The Singularity is Near, and 
McDermott's Critique of Kurzweil,” in Artificial Intelligence, 171:18 (2007), 1161-1173, 
doi:10.1016/j.artint.2007.10.011.  
3 Throughout the entire paper, the acronyms AI and AGI are used interchangeably. 
4 Ibid., 1162. 
5 The idea of a greater-than-human-level intelligence being a consequence of 
developing human-level AIs is further discussed in the subsequent sections. Note that such view 
may be traced in Irving John Good, “Speculations Concerning the First Ultraintelligent 
Machine,” in Advances in Computers, vol. 6, ed. by Franz L. Alt and Morris Rubinoff (New York: 
Academic Press, 1966). In addition, the same view is also discussed in David J. Chalmers, “The 
Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis,” in Journal of Consciousness Studies, 17:9-10 (2010), 7-65. 
6 See Vernon Vinge, “The Coming of Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the 
Post-Human Era,” in Vision 21: Interdisciplinary Science and Engineering in the Era of Cyberspace – 
Proceedings of A Symposium Cosponsored by NASA Lewis Research Center and the Ohio Aerospace 
Institute (Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of 
Management, Scientific and Technical Information Program, 1993), 11-22.  
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The term “singularity” has long been used in mathematics and 
(astro)physics. In mathematics, the singularity refers to “a value that 
transcends any finite limitation.”7 For example, the function y = 1/x leads to a 
singularity since the value of y increases as x approaches zero (e.g., 1/0.0001 
is greater than 1/0.001 as these operations result to 10,000 and 1,000, 
respectively). Keeping in mind that any number divided by zero yields a 
mathematically undefined result, the quotient reaches infinity as the value of 
x approaches this mark.8 In physics, the notion of a singularity could be best 
understood by looking at the aftermath of a star’s death (i.e., when a 
supernova occurs). Kurzweil explains that a “singularity” is created at the 
center of a massive star that undergoes a supernova explosion.9 The remnant 
of the star collapses to this center, which is said to be a point of apparently 
zero volume and infinite density. This rupture in the space-time fabric is then 
called a black hole.10 
The basic idea of a singularity within the fields of mathematics and 
physics, therefore, highlights instances wherein our standard models for 
understanding things just breakdown. This means that our most up-to-date 
theories cannot account for the phenomenon that needs explaining. For the 
present study, we consider another type of singularity—that is, the posited 
(technological) singularity that centers on intelligence. 
Science fiction literature serves as a storehouse of scientific 
knowledge, and it is able to project future technologies that are not yet 
available today.11 In a way, the same may be said with regard to the 
                                                 
7 Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (New York: 
Viking, 2005), 35-36. 
8 Note that there are mathematicians, like Nicholas of Cusa, who consider the concept 
of infinity as unknowable. See Jean-Michel Counet, “Mathematics and the Divine in Nicholas of 
Cusa,” in Mathematics and the Divine: A Historical Study, ed. by Teun Koetsier and Luc Bergmans 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V., 2005.), 271-290. 
9 Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near, 36. 
10 The difficulties of studying the very nature of black holes are well documented. For 
instance, see Brian Greene, The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the Quest for 
the Ultimate Theory (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999). Here it is highlighted that, in physics, 
it is widely accepted that Einstein’s theory of general relativity best fits the study of huge and 
heavy things (e.g., stars, planets, etc.). Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, is used to deal 
with small and light objects such as atoms, subatomic particles, and so on. The problem with 
black holes is that, as defined above, it is both heavy and small. So, does one use general relativity 
because black holes have an infinite density? Or, should quantum mechanics be used instead 
given that it is a finite point? Furthermore, all the laws (of physics) supposedly break down in 
such singularities. This idea is also highlighted in Stephen W. Hawking, A Brief History of Time 
(New York: Bantam Books, 1988) and Roger Penrose, “Black Holes,” in The World Treasury of 
Physics, Astronomy and Mathematics, ed. by Timothy Ferris (New York: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1991). 
11 This idea is discussed in Walter Moser and Craig Moyes, “Literature—A Storehouse 
of Knowledge?” in SubStance, 22 (1993), 126-140. 
 
 
 
R. BOYLES     185 
© 2018 Robert James M. Boyles 
https://www.kritike.org/journal/issue_22/boyles_june2018.pdf 
ISSN 1908-7330 
 
 
development of machines with artificial minds. Carter, for instance, notes that 
the abstract idea of “mechanical men” or robots may be traced back to the 
science fiction literature of the early to mid-twentieth century.12 
The idea of robots, or inanimate objects coming to life, dates back to 
the early Greeks, especially in the story of the mythological god Hephaestus, 
who created sophisticated machines.13 The term “robot,” on the other hand, 
was first used in Čapek’s play, R.U.R.,14 to refer to human-like creatures 
capable of intelligence. In a sense, before there was a full-blown academic 
discipline devoted to the study of both robotics and artificial intelligence, 
science fiction literature toyed with this idea first. The same turn from fiction 
to reality is envisaged by futurists concerning the idea of an intelligence 
explosion or a singularity.15  
In the discipline of artificial intelligence, the term “singularity” refers 
to a point in human history that would drastically change life on earth as this 
would mark the creation of greater-than-human intelligence, followed by an 
intelligence explosion.16 To differentiate this from its counterpart concepts in 
mathematics and astrophysics, this has been often dubbed as the 
“technological singularity.”17  
Many credit the statistician and computer scientist I.J. Good as one of 
the pioneers of the idea of a singularity, and the first who thought of the 
possible implications of an intelligence explosion through the rise of 
intelligent machines.18 The main idea is that, after the creation of the first 
ultraintelligent machine (i.e., a greater-than-human artificial intelligence 
system), an intelligent explosion would occur, since the first AI would (mass) 
produce the next generation of higher intelligent machines. In effect, by 
iterating this process, the result would be the creation of a whole assembly 
line of intelligent machines.19 In Good’s own words: 
 
                                                 
12 See Carter, Minds and Computers, 1. 
13 See Stefanos A. Paipetis, The Unknown Technology in Homer (Dordrecht: Springer 
Science+Business Media BV, 2010), 107-111. 
14 See Karel Čapek, R.U.R., trans. by David Wyllie (Adelaide: eBooks@Adelaide, 
University of Adelaide Library, 2016). 
15 Moravec’s idea of robot intelligence surpassing human intelligence before the year 
2050 is reminiscent here. See Hans P. Moravec, “Rise of the Robots,” in Understanding Artificial 
Intelligence, ed. by Sandy Fritz (New York: Warner Books, Inc., 2002), 114. 
16 See Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near, 24-25. 
17 For the purposes of this work, the term “singularity” would be used to simply refer 
to this. 
18 See Richard Loosemore and Ben Goertzel, “Why an Intelligence Explosion is 
Probable,” in Humanity+ Magazine (7 March 2011), <http://hplusmagazine.com/2011/03/07/why-
an-intelligence-explosion-is-probable/>. 
19 As discussed earlier, this is somewhat comparable to the value of x that becomes 
larger and larger. See Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near, 35-36. 
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Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine 
that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any 
man however clever. Since the design of machines is one 
of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent 
machine could design even better machines; there 
would then unquestionably be an “intelligence 
explosion,” and the intelligence of man would be left far 
behind. … Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the 
last invention that man need ever make, provided that 
the machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it 
under control. It is curious that this point is made so 
seldom outside of science fiction. It is sometimes 
worthwhile to take science fiction seriously.20 
 
Good argues that a direct consequence of developing ultraintelligent 
machines is the creation of more sophisticated AIs. These further creations, 
however, would not be designed by human beings any longer. For him, it is 
hard not to think of the scenario that these machines would eventually 
perform the same creative endeavors of modeling intelligent systems. But, 
given that this first generation of ultraintelligent machines are more 
intelligent than humans, it is conceivable that they would also be able to 
develop more sophisticated AI machines that could further surpass their own 
intellectual capabilities. In relation to this, also explaining the potential reason 
why these AI systems might undergo such process of self-improvement, 
Muehlhauser and Bostrom argue that: 
 
We can predict that advanced AIs will have instrumental 
goals to preserve themselves, acquire resources, and 
self-improve, because those goals are useful 
intermediaries to the achievement of almost any set of 
final goals. Thus, when we build an AI that is as skilled 
as we are at the task of designing AI systems, we may 
thereby initiate a rapid, AI-motivated cascade of self-
improvement cycles. Now when the AI improves itself, 
it improves the intelligence that does the improving, 
quickly leaving the human level of intelligence far 
behind.21 
 
                                                 
20 Good, “Speculations Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine,” 33. 
21 Luke Muehlhauser and Nick Bostrom, “Why We Need Friendly AI,” in Think, 36:13 
(2014), 42. 
 
 
 
R. BOYLES     187 
© 2018 Robert James M. Boyles 
https://www.kritike.org/journal/issue_22/boyles_june2018.pdf 
ISSN 1908-7330 
 
 
This is why Good states that the first ultraintelligent machine would arguably 
be the last invention of humankind. It is because all future generations of AI 
would be made by their fellow machines and so on. One other philosopher 
who has recently scrutinized the idea of the singularity is David Chalmers. 
For him, there are pros and cons to be considered. 
For Chalmers, the singularity could be considered one of the most 
significant events in human history.22 In a post-singularity world, life on earth 
may drastically change to the point of human incomprehensibility. Consider 
the impacts (i.e., both the positive and negative ones) that could result from 
the creation of sophisticated AI systems. 
For the positive effects of a singularity, it is very likely that remedies 
for certain diseases deemed incurable at present (e.g., HIV virus, cancer, etc.) 
could be discovered eventually as the intelligence level of those on earth 
continuously grows. Several social problems such as racial discrimination, 
food scarcity, and poverty, among others, could also be addressed by such 
intelligent beings, not to mention resolving age-old mathematical, scientific, 
and even philosophical puzzles, to name a few. Perhaps, it might be the case 
that these concerns only pervade us today because the current intellectual 
capabilities of humans are quite limited. The kinds of beings that would exist 
after the singularity, in contrast, would be of greater-than-human 
intelligence. Thus, it could be held that these problems could be solved by 
them.23 However, even though a singularity could yield positive outcomes, it 
could also produce negative ones. 
There are a number of potential dangers that might result from an 
intelligence explosion. Among these include the “end to the human race, an 
arms race of warring machines, [and] the power to destroy the planet.”24 The 
annihilation of humanity is not as far-fetched as one may think given that it 
is possible that AI systems and their next generations could have a different 
set of values compared to human beings.25 To hammer more on this point, 
consider a rough analogy motivated by the question: “Could it really be 
explained to pigs (i.e., making them fully understand) why it is ethically 
acceptable to slaughter them?” 
It could be said that pig’s meat is staple food for us, humans, and that 
this is a reasonable way of justifying why we slaughter and eat them. 
However, it might be difficult, if not impossible, to make pigs really 
understand this reason. Setting aside the obvious problem of conversing with 
                                                 
22 See Chalmers, “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis,” 4. 
23 Compare this with Kurzweil's view that any problem, insoluble as it may seem at 
present, has a corresponding solution (i.e., an idea). See Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near, 23-25. 
24 Chalmers, “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis,” 4. 
25 See ibid., 24-29. 
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one another, it could be said that, given their intellectual capacities, they 
would not be able to fully comprehend such rationale.26 
By the same token, it is plausible to suppose that the projected AI 
systems in the future would have a different value system from us given their 
higher level of intelligence. To further explain this, consider the different 
ways of arriving at artificial intelligence, which would, ideally, have to be 
considerate of human values as well. Chalmers, for instance, identifies two 
options, which are the human-based approaches and non-human-based 
ones.27 
 
Methods for Modeling Artificial Intelligence 
 
For Chalmers, there are two ways to develop artificial general 
intelligence, namely: human-based and non-human-based methods.28 Tracks 
toward the creation of artificial intelligence that employ human-based 
options extend or upgrade the biological makeup of humans.29 This means 
that such methods aim to duplicate or simulate the biological brains of human 
beings.30 The advantage of this approach is that “[t]he resulting systems are 
likely to have the same basic values as their human sources.”31 The ethical 
values of the ensuing AI creations that employ the human-based path would 
remain unchanged (i.e., to what they originally had before their enhancement 
procedure).  
Non-human-based options, on the other hand, build AIs through 
designing computer programs, learning systems, or any other means that 
does not enhance the biological constituents of humans. For these methods, 
Wallach and Allen identify three possible ways,32 namely: the top-down or 
direct programming track, bottom-up or developmental approaches, and the 
hybrid of these two. 
                                                 
26 Here, we could also relate Wittgenstein’s idea that, even if a lion could speak, human 
beings would not be able to understand it. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, Ltd., 1953), 190. 
27 See Chalmers, “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis,” 25-27. 
28 For the purposes of this paper, the human-based and non-human based options will 
be discussed in light of how they may account for ethical AI systems. 
29 See Chalmers, “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis,” 25-27. 
30 This coincides with Vinge’s four tracks towards creating greater-than-human-
intelligence. See Vinge, “The Coming of Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post-
Human Era.” Note that Vinge's intelligence amplification and biological approaches share 
certain commonalities with Chalmers’ concept of human-based artificial intelligence. This is 
because both support the idea of creating intelligent systems via harnessing the physiological 
makeup of human beings.  
31 Chalmers, “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis,” 25. 
32 An overview of all these tracks are highlighted in Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen, 
Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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Top-down approaches subscribe to the idea that artificial moral 
agents may be developed via programming moral principles into artifacts so 
that their actions and behaviors would be regulated by such precepts. 
Supporters of this track claim that human thinking processes resemble the 
ones implemented by computational systems. Thus, they argue that 
intelligent behavior may be instantiated by creating computer programs. 
Bottom-up options, on the other hand, employ evolutionary, learning, or 
developmental methodologies. Such approach enables machines to learn 
ethically-related concepts, for instance, via interacting with other agents in 
their respective environments. In a way, the manner by which AI systems 
learn and develop is similar to how children undergo the socialization 
process—that is, through learning things from scratch. Integrating the design 
principles of both top-down and bottom-up tracks is what is known as the 
hybrid option. 
The general idea behind the hybrid method is to embed autonomous 
artifacts with certain moral theories and, at the same time, allow it to further 
develop such principles, if not learn and acquire new ones, through the 
process of interacting with other agents. For Wallach and Allen, a feasible 
way of building AIs via the hybrid method is through the use of a 
connectionist model.33 Note that, for connectionists, the human cognitive 
architecture is just a series of networks that employs parallel distributed 
processing. Thus, advocates of connectionism emulate human brains via 
developing artificial neural networks.34 
The top-down, bottom-up, and hybrid approaches are some of the 
ways of constructing non-human-based artificial general intelligence. Note 
that, in contrast to human-based methods, such non-human-based tracks do 
not upgrade or make use of the biological makeup of humans. Thus, with 
regard to requiring autonomous agents to be moral agents as well, human-
based approaches supposedly have the upper hand.35 This is because the 
ethical values of the resulting AIs from human-based methods would remain 
unchanged, which further implies that there is a higher risk of building 
advanced AIs via the non-human-based route. This is not to say, however, 
                                                 
33 How a connectionist model may be considered a hybrid model is discussed in length 
by Wallach and Allen. See ibid., 121-124. 
34 It is believed that artificial neural networks could integrate the design principles of 
top-down and bottom-up routes. This is because such networks have two separate kinds of 
connection weights, namely: hardwired and learned connection weights. Supposedly, these 
weights may be considered to share the same principles with the top-down and bottom-up paths, 
respectively. For a discussion on connectionism, see Napoleon Mabaquiao, Jr., Mind, Science and 
Computation (Manila: Vibal Publishing House, Inc., 2012), 124-129. 
35 Chalmers further argues that human-based approaches are not “extendable,” and, 
as such, might not lead to a singularity. See Chalmers, “The Singularity: A Philosophical 
Analysis,” 26. 
 
 
 
190    A CASE FOR MACHINE ETHICS 
© 2018 Robert James M. Boyles 
https://www.kritike.org/journal/issue_22/boyles_june2018.pdf 
ISSN 1908-7330 
 
 
that the human-based path is foolproof. It could be argued that there is no 
certainty as to what would happen to their set of values once they also 
upgrade their computational, or thinking, capacities.36 
The idea of artificially intelligent machines having a different value 
system from humans could somehow be drawn from the design 
methodologies mentioned above. Unfortunately, for us, humans would be 
the lesser beings as compared to such superior intelligence. If a singularity 
were to happen, then human values would likely be incommensurable with 
these AI systems. Thus, the extinction of humankind may be foreseeable if 
safety measures would not be considered. With the risks involved in creating 
artificial intelligence, the question is, what now is the job of the philosopher 
in all of these issues? 
 
Technical and Foundational Problems 
 
Research on artificial intelligence has been encountering a number of 
problems for many years now. Such obstacles could be classified as either 
technical or foundational ones. Philosophers who wish to contribute in 
addressing, if not preventing, the potential dangers of a singularity may do 
so by doing research on the latter. 
Delineating one from the other, the technical problems of artificial 
intelligence may be defined as those that are presently encountered by the 
field given the current state of technology. However, once certain 
technological advancements occur, these issues, in theory, would cease to 
exist. Among these technical problems include issues regarding robustness 
and generalization, real-time processing, and the sequential nature of 
programs, among others.37 
For example, the issue on robustness and generalization focuses on 
the problem of noise and fault tolerance. Additionally, it also includes the 
issue regarding the capability of artifacts to act and react aptly in novel 
situations. Note that noise is defined as random data fluctuations. So, an 
artifact is said to be noise-tolerant if it could still process data that contains 
fluctuations. On the other hand, if an artifact performs adequately in spite of 
its faulty components, then it is considered to be fault-tolerant. 
Analogous to the issue of robustness, autonomous machines often 
lack the capability of acting and reacting to novel situations that were not 
originally programmed into them by their designers. This is because they lack 
generalization capabilities, which eventually results to an artifact halting or 
                                                 
36 In relation to this, see the same article of Chalmers, specifically his discussion on 
Kant’s view regarding values and rationality. See ibid. 
37 Rolf Pfeifer and Christian Scheier, Understanding Intelligence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1999), 63-64. 
 
 
 
R. BOYLES     191 
© 2018 Robert James M. Boyles 
https://www.kritike.org/journal/issue_22/boyles_june2018.pdf 
ISSN 1908-7330 
 
 
breaking down. However, the issue of both robustness and generalization 
may be considered technical ones as they are solvable, in principle, at the 
advent of technological improvements. In the future, once the current state of 
technology progresses, these technical problems would foreseeably go away. 
As for the foundational issues encountered by artificial intelligence 
research, these problems are considered philosophical in nature as they 
question the very foundations, or the foundational assumptions, of the 
methodologies themselves. Standard examples of these are the symbol-
grounding problem and frame problem. 
Pfeifer and Scheier explain that the symbol-grounding problem 
centers on the issue of how the closed system of physical symbols employed 
by classical artificial intelligent machines relate to the actual world.38 Note 
that physical symbols are defined purely in a syntactical manner. They follow 
the law of representation, which states that situations in the real world may 
be mapped into internal representations. So, these physical symbols are 
processed by a central processing system solely based on their syntax. The 
question is this: “If physical symbols correspond to specific things in the real 
world, how then could a syntax-based system ground and derive their 
meanings?” Put in another way, if traditional AI systems process symbols in 
a purely syntactical manner, then deriving or inferring the meanings of the 
employed symbols would still not have been accounted for. 
On the other hand, the frame problem focuses on the interaction 
between a modeled system and its corresponding environment. Simply put, 
this philosophical problem focuses on “how models of a changing 
environment can be kept in tune with the environment.”39 Given that artificial 
intelligent systems developed via the classical artificial intelligence path, for 
instance, have internal programs of the real world,40 the frame problem deals 
with how to properly identify from such world model those data that needs 
updating after an action takes place.41 Apparently, the task of keeping 
programs of changing environments in tune with the real world presents a 
number of difficulties. 
Note that the problems mentioned above are considered 
philosophical in nature as they question the foundational suppositions of the 
design strategies towards building AGIs. Another foundational issue that 
may interest philosophers deals with the problem of making artificially 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 69-71. 
39 Ibid., 68. 
40 Note that there are those who argue that the frame problem also arises in 
connectionist models. For instance, see Murray Shanahan, “The Frame Problem,” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2009 ed., ed. by Edward N. Zalta, 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/frame-problem/> (July 2013).  
41 Ibid. 
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intelligent machines capable of moral reasoning, judgment, and decision-
making—that is, the creation of artificial moral agents. As discussed earlier, 
the extinction of human beings may be a likely consequence if safety 
measures are not considered in designing AI systems. This is the reason why 
the research area of machine ethics looks into the possibility of modeling the 
first batch of AIs as being considerate of human values as well. 
 
Machine Ethics and the Nature of Moral Agents 
 
Michael Anderson and Susan Anderson tell us that: 
 
[M]achine ethics is concerned with giving machines 
ethical principles or a procedure for discovering a way 
to resolve the ethical dilemmas they might encounter, 
enabling them to function in an ethically responsible 
manner through their own ethical decision making.42 
 
What this tells us is simple: machine ethics is concerned about the creation of 
AMAs—artificial intelligent machines capable of moral reasoning. Note that 
this field is often contrasted with the closely related discipline of technology 
ethics. In a nutshell, technology ethics is a branch of applied ethics largely 
devoted in developing ethics for human beings who use machines or 
technology.43 
Distinguishing machine ethics from the philosophy of technology is 
important, since the latter is more concerned with the ethical standing of 
human beings who use technological products such as intelligent machines 
(i.e., it looks at the proper and improper human behavior with regard to the 
usage of machines). Thus, it considers machines as tools and not as 
autonomous agents. Machine ethics, in contrast, regards machines as actual 
or potential moral agents. 
For machine ethicists, moral praise and blame could be attributed to 
the actions of autonomous agents, and it seems that there are good reasons to 
think that, indeed, sophisticated technologies may be considered as moral 
agents. Note that moral agents are specific kinds of entities whose behaviors 
are subject to moral requirements (i.e., under a set of ethical standards, moral 
praise or blame could be ascribed to its actions).44 
                                                 
42 Michael Anderson and Susan Leigh Anderson, Machine Ethics (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1. 
43 See Wallach and Allen, Moral Machines, 37-39. 
44 See Kenneth Einar Himma, “Artificial Agency, Consciousness, and the Criteria for 
Moral Agency: What Properties must an Artificial Agent have to be a Moral Agent?” in Ethics 
and Information Technology, 11 (2009), 21. 
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 In the philosophical tradition, discussions regarding the nature of 
moral agents are nothing new. Several philosophers have already put 
forward their own take on the nature of moral agents. For example, Aristotle: 
 
[i]n the course of discussing human virtues and their 
corresponding vices … begins with a brief statement of 
the concept of moral responsibility—that it is sometimes 
appropriate to respond to an agent with praise or blame 
on the basis of her actions and/or dispositional traits of 
character. … A bit later, he clarifies that only a certain 
kind of agent qualifies as a moral agent and is thus 
properly subject to ascriptions of responsibility, namely, 
one who possess a capacity for decision. For Aristotle, a 
decision is a particular kind of desire resulting from 
deliberation, one that expresses the agent's conception of 
what is good.45 
 
In a way, such notion parallels Aquinas’ idea that “[g]ood ends and means 
are those befitting the human agent.”46 For Aquinas, as with Aristotle, the 
said agent should be capable of deliberating and judging what action is 
good,47 and these actions are called human actions—that is, actions that 
which one has voluntary control of or those that result from certain free 
judgements. To account for the nature of such free judgments, Aquinas 
explains: 
 
The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say that we 
have a free-will because we can take one thing while 
refusing another; and this is to choose. Therefore we 
must consider the nature of free-will, by considering the 
nature of choice. Now two things concur in choice: one 
on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part 
of the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive 
power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing 
to be preferred to another: and on the part of the 
                                                 
45 See Andrew Eshleman, “Moral Responsibility,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Summer 2014 ed., ed. by Edward N. Zalta, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
sum2014/entries/moral-responsibility/> (June 2015).   
46 Ralph McInerny, “Aquinas's Moral Theory,” in Journal of Medical Ethics, 13:1 (1987), 
31-33. 
47 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. by the Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province, rev. by Daniel J. Sullivan (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952), IaIIae 1.1. 
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appetitive power, it is required that the appetite should 
accept the judgment of counsel.48 
 
So, for Aquinas, moral agents are those who have mastery over one’s actions, 
exemplified by their ability to prefer what is good. This same line of thinking 
seems to be echoed by other philosophers such as Kant. For Kant, “a moral 
agent is autonomous in that it both gives itself the moral law (it is self-
legislating) and can constrain or motivate itself to follow the law (it is self-
constraining or self-motivating).”49 In such characterization, note that Kant 
highlights the notion of a moral agent being autonomous.50 To a certain 
extent, these characterizations of moral agency, along with the other 
philosophical theories51 that try to account for its nature, relate to the idea of 
building artificial moral agents. 
 
Safeguarding Humanity via Artificial Moral Agents 
 
One possible way of preventing the negative outcomes of a 
singularity would be in terms of how philosophers could further involve 
themselves in addressing problems related to artificial moral agency. For one, 
there is the issue regarding the nature of such agents. 
In terms of accounting for artificial moral agency, several theories 
have been proposed by those working under the field of machine ethics. 
Sullins,52 for instance, defines artificial moral agents as artificial autonomous 
agents53 that possess moral value. He first explains that: 
 
                                                 
48 Ibid., Ia 83.3. 
49 Lara Denis, “Kant and Hume on Morality,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Fall 2012 ed., ed. by Edward N. Zalta, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ 
fall2012/entries/kant-hume-morality/> (7 December 2015). 
50 For Kant’s discussion regarding the nature of moral agents, specifically the concepts 
of will and autonomy, see Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals, ed. and trans. 
by Allen W. Wood (Yale University Press, 2002), 4:440. 
51 Other theories on moral agency are discussed extensively in Theodore C. Denise, 
Great Traditions in Ethics (California: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008). 
52 See John Sullins, “Artificial Moral Agency in Technoethics,” in Handbook of Research 
on Technoethics, ed. by Roccio Luppicini and Rebecca Adell (Hershey: IGI Global Information 
Science, 2009), 205-221. 
53 In defining autonomous agents as systems that act upon their situated environment 
in pursuit of their own agenda, Sullins cites Stan Franklin and Art Graesser, “Is it an Agent, or 
just a Program?: A Taxonomy for Autonomous Agents,” in Proceedings of the Third International 
Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (London: Springer-Verlag, 1996). Such 
characterization implies that agents are presupposed as entities that have causal influence or 
effect on other agents and their environment. Thus, any piece of technology, a sophisticated 
robot, for instance, that acts as an agent is considered an autonomous agent. 
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[I]deally, the agent should be a continuous process that 
monitors its environment, be able to communicate with 
its user or at least other simple agents, have some sort of 
machine learning, and be mobile in its environment or 
able to move to other environments, as well as be flexible 
in its reactions to stimulus in these environments. It is 
also a bonus if the artificial agent is affective in its 
character in order to interact with a realistic personality 
that will ease communications with human agents.54 
 
Note that these specific qualities are not necessary conditions for artificial 
agency but are conditions that may aid artificial agents in trying to interact 
with others and the rest of the world. 
On top of these qualities, three other conditions would have to obtain 
in order to ascribe moral agency to artifacts. These are the conditions of 
autonomy, intentionality, and responsibility. For an artifact to have the 
capacity to exhibit moral responsibility, it should possess significant 
autonomy. Thus, an artifact should be capable of performing autonomous 
actions (i.e., it should be able to implement tasks or goals independent of any 
other agent). In addition, agents must also possess the capability of acting 
intentionally. Lastly, it would be possible to ascribe moral agency to artifacts 
if its behaviors would only make sense by assuming that it has responsibility 
towards other moral agents. These three conditions supposedly provide a 
deeper understanding on the nature of AMAs. For Sullins, as long as these 
things obtain, an artifact could be said to be an artificial moral agent. 
In contrast to Sullins, Moor proposed a four-tier categorization of 
artifacts in terms of appraising their moral status.55 At the bottom-most level 
are ethical-impact agents. These machines are evaluated based on the moral 
consequences they produce. Next, machines that have built-in safety features 
could be considered as implicit ethical agents. To promote ethical behavior, 
the internal mechanisms of such machines have already been designed to 
consider potential safety and reliability issues. Explicit ethical agents, on the 
other hand, are a tier higher than implicit ethical agents. This is because such 
machines already have some capacity to exhibit moral reasoning. At the top-
most level of this hierarchy are full ethical agents. Average adult human 
beings are an instance of this type of agent. Artificial moral agents, for Moor, 
are somewhere in-between explicit ethical agents and full ethical ones. 
                                                 
54 Sullins, “Artificial Moral Agency in Technoethics,” 207. 
55 James H. Moor, “The Nature, Importance, and Difficulty of Machine Ethics,” in 
Machine Ethics, ed. by Michael Anderson and Susan Leigh Anderson (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 13-20. 
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A third alternative is provided by Wallach and Allen. They argue that 
the path towards the creation of artificial moral agents is through considering 
the conditions of autonomy and ethical sensitivity.56 First, they categorize 
machines as either having operational morality or functional morality. 
Machines with operational morality are those that are capable of taking into 
account the morally-relevant aspects of a given situation with the aid of 
human architects. These architects embed ethical considerations into the said 
machines. Machines that fall under functional morality, on the other hand, 
are those that possess the capacity to exhibit some form of moral reasoning 
and decision-making. 
Such categorization forms a spectrum. One finds machines that fall 
under operational morality on one end of this spectrum and, on the other end, 
are full moral agents—that is, artifacts that have high autonomy and high 
ethical sensitivity. Moreover, machines that fall under functional morality are 
distributed in-between of these two extremes. Wallach and Allen claim that 
this two-dimensional framework could possibly account for artificial moral 
agency since the conditions of autonomy and ethical sensitivity serve as 
benchmarks as to what counts as a full moral agent. Any machine 
approaching high autonomy and high ethical sensitivity will be counted as a 
full moral agent, and this could be achieved by incrementally improving 
these conditions. 
At present, there seems to be no hard consensus as to which artificial 
moral agency framework would likely yield a positive result. For instance, 
the idea of reducing the three mentioned above into a single, all-
encompassing theory has not yet been fully explored. Furthermore, how 
exactly shall we proceed in actually realizing artificial moral agents is another 
problem in machine ethics. These issues, among the many others that also 
need final resolution, should be the business of philosophers. With the body 
of work that they have contributed in the study of moral agency, philosophers 
should continue to extend their research in the field of machine ethics. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
As discussed above, the singularity is a hypothesized, futuristic event 
that pertains to the invention of machines that are of greater-than-human-
level intelligence. This scenario may be considered a natural consequence of 
developing AI systems. Once these things are fully realized, an intelligence 
explosion would follow soon after. Note that such runaway would seemingly 
put into question humankind’s standard concepts about reality, life, and so 
on, and this would also include our general ethical notions. 
                                                 
56 Wallach and Allen, Moral Machines, 25-33. 
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At present, there is no definitive way on how to make artificially 
intelligent systems value what humans do. The idea of machines 
exterminating the entire human race, therefore, is not, strictly speaking, a tall 
tale. As highlighted by both Vinge and Chalmers, there are plausible threats. 
To prevent these dangers, those working in artificial intelligence research, 
including philosophers, should take the problem of creating artificial moral 
agents more seriously. Philosophers, for instance, should further examine the 
philosophical tenability of the top-down, bottom-up, and hybrid options, 
among others, of modeling such agents. For one, as noted earlier, the actual 
nature of AMAs is still an open question. With their significant contributions 
in the study of moral agency, philosophers should, therefore, further examine 
this issue.  
Other philosophical concepts such as moral reasoning, moral agency, 
and others may also be re-examined by philosophers as they closely relate to 
notion of artificial moral agency. For example, with regard to the notion of 
moral agency, there are those who argue that humans are not really moral 
agents. Nadeau, for instance, maintains that robots would be, in fact, the first 
moral agents to inhabit earth, if ever.57 If we consider such view, then the 
question is this: if our conception of moral agency is predicated on the view 
that human beings are moral agents, then what happens to this notion if it is 
proven that the latter claim is false? In addition, there are other issues related 
to AI research that may also be further studied by philosophers. Among these 
include problems regarding the concept of consciousness and personal 
identity.58 
Analyzing the foundational issues surrounding artificial intelligence 
research is key in safeguarding the future of humanity. Considering the 
gravity of the potential negative outcomes of a singularity, factor in also the 
open questions in modeling AMAs, it may be the case that there would not 
be an overabundance of philosophers working on the issues related to 
machine ethics—that is, at least for now.  
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